In this 4-part series, I’m reflecting on how I saw what just happened. I’m looking at it as a marketer and communications professional, and as a linguist, trying to decode what enabled Orbán to stay in power for so long. In the final post, I’ll turn to the question of restitution. That’s a difficult conversation, and one that inevitably brings up uncomfortable historical parallels.
What just happened in Hungary
When language becomes a weapon – coming soon
The banality of silence – coming soon
In my previous post, I wrote about what the night of the election felt like. This one is about what was happening underneath it. Because what we witnessed in Hungary was not just a political campaign. It was the construction of two parallel realities where ultimately, truth won.
A word on opinion polls
In Hungary, several opinion polling institutes regularly survey voting intentions. Political parties and press outlets often commission these and pay for them.
Over time, this became a problem.
Because instead of asking what do the numbers show?, the question shifted to who paid for this?
The Orbán system leaned into this heavily.
Polling institutes were labelled by Orbán as “left” or “right”. Their credibility wasn’t judged by methodology or track record, but by perceived political alignment.
Even one of the most established, respected and independent institutes, Medián, was accused of manipulating data, not because of flawed methods, but because their projections were so far from what government-aligned narratives presented as reality that FIDESZ would win.
At that point, it was no longer about numbers. It became about whether to believe them at all.
There were their polls – and our polls. And people chose accordingly.
In hindsight, this created something deeper: Two parallel realities.
Median’s projections turned out to be strikingly accurate, including the two-thirds majority for Peter Magyar’s TISZA party. And yet, it’s clear that Orbán and many of his supporters did not believe these numbers. They believed a different version of reality.
And that’s where it becomes dangerous. Because this is no longer about politics. It’s about how truth itself is negotiated.
When trust in independent measurement collapses, what replaces it is not uncertainty but belief. Two echo chambers. Two systems of belief. Two realities. And when the result finally comes in, clear and undeniable, the shock is not just political. It is existential.
Slogans, messages, narrative frames
Fidesz (Orban’s party) core campaign slogan was “Biztos választás” (“A safe / sure choice”). You could see a few key repeated message units, such as these:
- War will come if the opposition wins.
- Hungary must stay out of the war.
- Migration threat
- Gender threat
- This election decides the fate of Hungary.
Fidesz used an existential framing to project that survival is what’s at stake.
You could also see attack-style billboard messaging, such as:
- “Money for Ukraine? YES!”
- “Tax increases? YES!”
- “Stop Russian oil? YES!”
These are not slogans in the classical sense but extremely effective framing devices that assign positions to the opponent.
Fidesz also used various meta-slogans that were repeated across all channels, such as:
- Stability vs chaos
- Sovereignty vs external pressure
- Peace vs war
- “Only we can protect Hungary”
TISZA, on the other hand, was less slogan-heavy in a traditional sense and used a more movement-driven messaging.
The core emotional message they used was Ne féljetek” (“Don’t be afraid”). This is arguably a strong counter-message to Fidesz’s fearmongering. Not just political but also psychological.
You could hear the crowds spontaneously bursting out, chanting “Európa! Európa!” as a way to signal belonging, identity and direction.
Core campaign themes and repeated messages in speeches, content and positioning were:
- Anti-corruption
- Rule of law restored
- “Bring back EU funds”
- Free press
- Accountability
- “System change”
Perhaps these were less punchy slogans, but offered an issue-based clarity.
The messaging itself was more movement-style:
- “Change”
- “New Hungary”
- “End of the system”
- “We can do this” (implicit tone across rallies)
These were often spoken, not branded.
This is how I could summarise it in the simplest way:
| FIDESZ | TISZA |
|---|---|
| Safety | Courage |
| Fear | Hope |
| Control | Movement |
| Paid repetition | Organic spread |
| “We protect you” | “Don’t be afraid” |
The machinery behind the campaigns
From a marketing communications perspective, what we saw on the Orban side was a highly controlled, heavily funded system operating across all channels.
If we look at it through the POEM framework which we often use in marketing communications planning and analysis (paid, owned, earned media channels), the imbalance becomes very clear.
Paid media: saturation and fear
On the Fidesz side (Orban’s party), paid media was everywhere. Massive amounts of public money were spent on advertising – billboards, print, digital placements, with messaging that was consistent and relentless.
The language was deliberately simple. Clear. Repetitive. Accessible to everyone, regardless of education level. And it worked, for a long time.
Paid media didn’t stop at traditional advertising.
Influencers, celebrities, public figures, many of them were visibly aligned with the government’s messaging. It is difficult to ignore the role of agencies operating in the background, coordinating and amplifying these voices. Whether directly or indirectly, public funds were part of this ecosystem.
The message travelled far, and it travelled fast: FIDESZ is the safe choice, the party that brings peace. TISZA brings war and chaos.
Owned media: control and misuse
Fidesz also maintained a strong network of owned media channels.
Pro-government media outlets, newsletters, direct communication channels, all reinforcing the same narrative.
One particularly concerning example was the use of email databases originally created during COVID. These were intended for public health communication, to keep citizens informed.
But over time, these lists were used to distribute political messaging, blurring the line between government communication and party propaganda. From a data protection perspective, this raises serious questions. And it’s something that will likely need to be addressed and investigated going forward.
Earned media: where the system weakened
This is where the contrast becomes most visible.
Earned media – organic support, voluntary advocacy – was limited. It simply wasn’t “cool” to support Viktor Orbán publicly, out of conviction.
Toward the end of the campaign, there was a push encouraging supporters to record portrait-style videos and share them online. But it felt… orchestrated. Not organic. Not spontaneous at all. And that matters, because earned media only works when people want to speak, not when they are prompted to.
A system closing in on itself
At some point, even the digital strategy began to reflect this isolation. When platforms like Meta no longer allowed political advertising, Fidesz tried to outmaneuver this by creating structures they called “digital fighters clubs”. These were closed online spaces. Supporters of Fidesz speaking to supporters prompting them to spread their messages outside their circles. Reinforcing the same narratives.
These surely strengthened their belief – but ultimately weakened their connection to reality as it created even more echo in their echo chambers.
The other side: movement, not machine
What Péter Magyar built was fundamentally different. It didn’t start as a system. It started as a movement. Communities forming organically. People organising themselves. Conversations happening offline, in real spaces.
Things that Fidesz itself had done 16 years ago, and, over time, seems to have forgotten.
Presence vs distance
In the final weeks, the contrast became impossible to ignore.
Péter Magyar was everywhere. Travelling across the country. Five, six, sometimes seven locations a day. Towns, villages, cities. Meeting people face to face. Listening. Speaking to them.
His candidates did the same in their local areas. There was a sense of proximity. Of real connection.
Meanwhile, when Viktor Orbán stepped out into the physical world, 2 weeks before election day, the response was… quite different. The disagreement was audible. But it was too late.
POEM, in summary
If we look again at the POEM framework, here is what we see.
Paid media:
Fidesz dominated.
TISZA had very limited resources. Instead of billboards, people offered their own spaces, fences, balconies, to display banners.
Owned media:
Péter Magyar built strong digital channels, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube. Even Discord. Later, their own app.
Spaces where people could connect, organise, stay informed.
On the other side, owned media had long been consolidated. A large part of the press landscape was controlled by Orbán-aligned actors, while state media consistently echoed party messaging, often blurring the line between fact and opinion.
(Going forward, this will be one of the key areas to address, as efforts begin to restore a more balanced and independent public media environment.)
Earned media:
This is where Péter Magyar won.
Influencers, public figures, ordinary people, those who supported him did so without payment. And at personal risk: Reputation. Career. Future opportunities. That kind of support cannot be bought.
| Channel | FIDESZ | TISZA |
|---|---|---|
| Paid Media | high spend (public funds)billboard saturation, fear-based messaging, ridicule / attack ads, simple, repetitive language, paid influencers / celebrities, central coordination | minimal budget, grassroots visibility, banners (fences, balconies), community amplification, no paid influencers, message over money |
| Owned Media | centralised controlpro-government media ecosystemone-way communicationnewsletters (state → party blur)database use (COVID lists)message discipline | fast-built digital ecosystemFacebook, Instagram, TikTok, YouTubeDiscord → app (“TISZA world”)community spacesinteraction, mobilisationdecentralised energy |
| Earned Media | weak organic supportlow authenticity“not cool” factorprompted participationtop-down communicationecho chambers | strong organic momentumvoluntary supportunpaid influencers (high risk)youth mobilisationhigh turnout (~80%)movement energy |
In the end, this wasn’t just a contest of campaigns. It was a confrontation between two ways of seeing the world.
One built on control, repetition, and fear. The other on connection, participation, and courage. And when those two realities collided, only one could hold.
Gabriella Ferenczi 
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